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1 UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

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4 BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
5 AND INTERFERENCES
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8 *Ex parte* ARTHUR ERNEST CONRAD, GREGORY J. DECKER, and
9 JOSEPH F. CELANO
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12 Appeal 2008-0602
13 Application 09/903,976
14 Technology Center 3600
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17 Decided: February 29, 2008
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20 Before HUBERT C. LORIN, ANTON W. FETTING, and
21 JOSEPH A. FISCHETTI, *Administrative Patent Judges*.
22 FETTING, *Administrative Patent Judge*.

23 DECISION ON APPEAL

24 STATEMENT OF CASE

25 Arthur Ernest Conrad, Gregory J. Decker, and Joseph F. Celano
26 (Appellants) seek review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of a final rejection of claims
27 1-44, the only claims pending in the application on appeal.

We have jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 6(b) (2002).

We REVERSE and ENTER A NEW GROUND UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b).

The Appellants invented a system for displaying content, as directed by a process referred to as a web attract loop, on a display of a user computer. The system transmits a web page to a user computer in response to a request. The web page includes the web attract loop code which monitors the user computer for a user event, and if the user event does not occur within a specified time period, the attract loop code automatically transmits a request for attract loop content to the central computer. The central computer automatically transmits attract loop content to the user computer in response to the request, and the attract loop code causes the attract loop content to be displayed on the display of the user computer (Specification 4-5:¶ 0012).

An understanding of the invention can be derived from a reading of exemplary claim 44, which is reproduced below (bracketed matter and some paragraphing added).

44. A method for displaying web content on a display of a user computer, said method comprising the steps of:

[1] receiving a request to transmit a web page; and

[2] transmitting a web page to the user computer in response to the request to transmit a web page,

the web page comprising attract loop code and attract loop content,

wherein the attract loop code monitors the user computer for a user event, and

only if the user event does not occur within a specified
time period,
the attract loop code automatically causes the
attract loop content to be displayed on the display
of the user computer.

This appeal arises from the Examiner's Final Rejection, mailed July
12, 2006. The Appellants filed an Appeal Brief in support of the appeal on
December 14, 2006. An Examiner's Answer to the Appeal Brief was mailed
on April 5, 2007. A Reply Brief was filed on June 5, 2007.

PRIOR ART

The Examiner relies upon the following prior art:

Park	US 6,295,061 B1	Sep. 25, 2001
David Barboza, <i>An internet newcomer is making money by selling moving ads as part of screen savers</i> , The New York Times, (Oct. 1, 1996), at D7.		

We also discuss the following art in this Decision.

Gerszberg	US 6,084,583	Jul. 4, 2000
Cho	US 6,834,048 B1	Dec. 21, 2004

REJECTIONS

Claims 1-6, 8-16, 18-28, 30-38, and 40-44 stand rejected under 35
U.S.C. § 102(e) as anticipated by Park.

Claims 7, 17, 29, and 39 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Park and Barboza.

ISSUES

The issues pertinent to this appeal are

- Whether the Appellants have sustained their burden of showing that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1-6, 8-16, 18-28, 30-38, and 40-44 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as anticipated by Park.
- Whether the Appellants have sustained their burden of showing that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 7, 17, 29, and 39 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Park and Barboza.

The pertinent issue turns on whether Park describes code that monitors for a user event, and only if the user event does not occur within a specified time period, the code automatically causes certain content to be displayed.

FACTS PERTINENT TO THE ISSUES

The following enumerated Findings of Fact (FF) are supported by a preponderance of the evidence.

Park

01. Park is directed to dynamically and interactively displaying images near a pointer or cursor in response to the movement or activity of a pointing device (Park 3:59-62).
02. Park describes a lapse of time as among the set of standard events its pointing device will consider to be a predefined activity which may change the display of an advertisement (Park 9:58-65; Fig. 9).

03. Park does not describe any activity that would terminate a standard activity, such as an elapsed period of time, other than the occurrence of that event. Thus, if an elapse of time is a standard event, whatever is to occur upon that event's occurrence occurs in Park, irrespective of any other event.

Barboza

04. Barboza describes the Pointcast news and information service which it supplies with advertisements (Barboza 7-10) and delivers through its channel viewer, which also acts as a screen saver (Barboza 15-17).

Facts Related To The Level Of Skill In The Art

05. Neither the Examiner nor the Appellants has addressed the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent arts of tracking items and data formatting. We will therefore consider the cited prior art as representative of the level of ordinary skill in the art. *See Okajima v. Bourdeau*, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[T]he absence of specific findings on the level of skill in the art does not give rise to reversible error ‘where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown’”) (quoting *Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp.*, 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Fed. Cir. 1985)).

Facts Related To Secondary Considerations

06. There is no evidence on record of secondary considerations of non-obviousness for our consideration.

PRINCIPLES OF LAW

Claim Construction

During examination of a patent application, pending claims are given their broadest reasonable construction consistent with the specification. *In re Prater*, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404-05 (CCPA 1969); *In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr.*, 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

Limitations appearing in the specification but not recited in the claim are not read into the claim. *E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. 3Com Corp.*, 343 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (claims must be interpreted “in view of the specification” without importing limitations from the specification into the claims unnecessarily).

Although a patent applicant is entitled to be his or her own lexicographer of patent claim terms, in *ex parte* prosecution it must be within limits. *In re Corr*, 347 F.2d 578, 580 (CCPA 1965). The applicant must do so by placing such definitions in the specification with sufficient clarity to provide a person of ordinary skill in the art with clear and precise notice of the meaning that is to be construed. *See also In re Paulsen*, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (although an inventor is free to define the specific terms used to describe the invention, this must be done with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision; where an inventor chooses to give terms uncommon meanings, the inventor must set out any uncommon definition in some manner within the patent disclosure so as to give one of ordinary skill in the art notice of the change).

Anticipation

1 "A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in
2 the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior
3 art reference." *Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co.*, 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed.
4 Cir. 1987). "When a claim covers several structures or compositions, either
5 generically or as alternatives, the claim is deemed anticipated if any of the
6 structures or compositions within the scope of the claim is known in the
7 prior art." *Brown v. 3M*, 265 F.3d 1349, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001). "The
8 identical invention must be shown in as complete detail as is contained in the
9 ... claim." *Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co.*, 868 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir.
10 1989). The elements must be arranged as required by the claim, but this is
11 not an *ipsissimis verbis* test, i.e., identity of terminology is not required. *In*
12 *re Bond*, 910 F.2d 831, 832 (Fed. Cir. 1990).

13 *Obviousness*

14 A claimed invention is unpatentable if the differences between it and
15 the prior art are "such that the subject matter as a whole would have been
16 obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill
17 in the art." 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000); *KSR Int'l v. Teleflex Inc.*, 127 S.Ct.
18 1727, 1729-30 (2007); *Graham v. John Deere Co.*, 383 U.S. 1, 13-14
19 (1966).

20 In *Graham*, the Court held that that the obviousness analysis is
21 bottomed on several basic factual inquiries: "[(1)] the scope and content of
22 the prior art are to be determined; [(2)] differences between the prior art and
23 the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and [(3)] the level of ordinary skill
24 in the pertinent art resolved." 383 U.S. at 17. *See also KSR Int'l v. Teleflex*
25 *Inc.*, 127 S.Ct. at 1734. "The combination of familiar elements according to

known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.” *KSR*, at 1739.

“When a work is available in one field of endeavor, design incentives and other market forces can prompt variations of it, either in the same field or in a different one. If a person of ordinary skill in the art can implement a predictable variation, § 103 likely bars its patentability.” *Id.* at 1740.

“For the same reason, if a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.” *Id.*

“Under the correct analysis, any need or problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of invention and addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining the elements in the manner claimed.” *Id.* at 1742.

ANALYSIS

Claims 1-6, 8-16, 18-28, 30-38, and 40-44 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as anticipated by Park.

The Appellants argue these claims as a group.

Accordingly, we select claim 1 as representative of the group.
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii) (2007).

The Examiner found that Park anticipated claim 1 (Answer 3-4).

The Appellants contend that Park does not monitor for a user event, and only if the user event does not occur within a specified time period, the code automatically causes certain content to be displayed (Appeal Br. 11-13). In particular, the Appellants argue that Park’s elapsed time event is a

1 simple timer and is not reset by another event. As a result, the code that
2 automatically causes display is not monitoring user events and not executing
3 the display only if a user event does not occur within a specified time period
4 (Appeal Br. 13).

5 The Examiner responds that Park 9:62 – 10:6 describes a lapse of time
6 as an activity that can cause a display. The Examiner finds that Park is not
7 just a timer, but displays advertisements if non-movement of a mouse is
8 detected for a certain period of time (Answer 8). The Appellants respond in
9 turn that although Park may display an advertisement after an elapse in time,
10 this occurs purely upon such a time lapse and there is no further criteria of
11 non-movement of a pointer for such a display (Reply Br. 2-3).

12 We agree. While Park does describe displaying advertisements in
13 response to predefined activities (FF 01) and using time lapse as one of those
14 activities (FF 02), Park does not describe anything that would create the only
15 if condition required in claim 1 (FF 03). The portion cited by the Examiner
16 of Park states

17 Moreover, the pointing device activity further includes a
18 combination of standard events such as *a lapse of time*
19 *regardless of any user's pointing device activity*. Further
20 examples of such activities include an X trace with pointing
21 device 12 (FIG. 11), shaking pointing device 12 (FIG. 13), an O
22 trace made by pointing device 12 (see FIG. 10) or various
23 shapes of traces with the pointing device, lapse of certain time,
24 movement of cursor in a certain area within the working
25 window, a scroll of the working window, etc. Thus, the present
26 invention can be easily programed [sic] to recognize various
27 forms of activities for implementation. [Emphasis not in
28 original.]

(Park 9:62 – 10:6.) We find that the caveat to *a lapse of time of regardless of any user's pointing device activity* implicitly negates the Examiner's finding of non-movement of a mouse being part of this event. It may very well occur that there will be no movement, but the claim requires that the display occur only if, not simply if, there is no movement. It may also occur that movement of a pointer would itself trigger a display, but the plain reading of Park implies that the timer will still cause its display at the end of the time lapse. Thus, the Examiner has erred in finding that Park describes code that monitors for a user event, and only if the user event does not occur within a specified time period, the code automatically causes certain content to be displayed.

The Appellants have sustained their burden of showing that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1-6, 8-16, 18-28, 30-38, and 40-44 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as anticipated by Park.

Claims 7, 17, 29, and 39 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Park and Barboza.

These claims recite the same limitation of code that monitors for a user event, and only if the user event does not occur within a specified time period, the code automatically causes certain content to be displayed. Although Barboza mentions a screen saver, Barboza provides no details, and the Examiner has not shown that Barboza describes the limitation of code that monitors for a user event, and only if the user event does not occur within a specified time period, the code automatically causes certain content to be displayed.

08. Gerszberg's controller may connect to a personal computer
(Gerszberg 4:13-25).

09. Each of the devices connected to Gerszberg's device may be
connected to the internet and use TCP/IP, the internet
communication protocol (Gerszberg 5:28-40).

10. Gerszberg describes connecting to a central computer
(Gerszberg 6:36-48; Fig. 4A).

11. Gerszberg's central computer sends updated screen saver
content to the phone (Gerszberg 8:26-29).

12. Gerszberg describes the logic of its screen saver as monitoring
activity, and only when no activity has been detected for a
predetermined period of time, displaying a screen saver content
(Gerszberg 8:43-65; Fig. 6).

13. Gerszberg describes updating the screen saver content by
having the device having the display call for new content after the
existing content has been displayed for some period of time
(Gerszberg 9:8-11).

Cho

14. Cho is directed to initiating an internet telephone service from a
web page with Voice over internet protocol (VoIP) technology
(Cho 33-60).

ANALYSIS

All of the independent claims have substantially the same limitations.
We analyze how Gerszberg and Cho render claim 1 unpatentable. The

1 analysis of patentability for claim 1 is then applicable to the remaining
2 independent claims in this rejection. The facts of Gerszberg and Cho
3 describe claim 1 limitations as follows.

4 1. A system for displaying a web content on a display of a user
5 computer, said system comprising:

6 a central computer; [FF 10]

7 software executing on said central computer for receiving a
8 request to transmit a web page; [Gerszberg describes receiving
9 a request to transmit content to a phone (FF 13); Cho describes
10 using a web page for phone service and VOIP (FF 14)]

11 software executing on said central computer for transmitting a
12 web page to the user computer in response to the request to
13 transmit a web page, [FF 11]

14 the web page comprising attract loop code, wherein the attract
15 loop code monitors the user computer for a user event, and only
16 if the user event does not occur within a specified time period,
17 the attract loop code automatically transmits a request for
18 attract loop content to said central computer; [FF 12]

19 software executing on said central computer for automatically
20 transmitting attract loop content to the user computer in
21 response to the request for attract loop content; and [FF 12]

22 wherein the attract loop code causes the attract loop content to
23 be displayed on the display of the user computer [FF 12].

24 Basically, Gerszberg describes all of the limitations of claim 1, and in
25 particular, a screen saver, including the details of the programming logic that
26 both monitors for activity and displays content only if such activity is not
27 provided within a specific period of time [FF 12] and having the client call
28 for screen saver content from the server [FF 13], except for the transmission
29 of a web page. Gerszberg's transmission may be internet content, which
30 would suggest web content. Cho demonstrates that Gerszberg's videophone
31 may be a computer using VOIP with web pages. Thus, Gerszberg's

screensaver on Cho's VOIP videophone would use web pages for its downloaded content to be compatible with Cho's web pages. It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to have applied Gersberg's videophone within Cho's VOIP context because of Cho's taught application to phone service.

The Examiner should consider the patentability of the dependent claims under Gersberg, Cho, and the remaining art of record.

DECISION

To summarize, our decision is as follows:

- The rejection of claims 1-6, 8-16, 18-28, 30-38, and 40-44 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as anticipated by Park is not sustained.
- The rejection of claims 7, 17, 29, and 39 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Park and Barboza is not sustained.
- The following new ground of rejection is entered pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b).
 - Independent claims 1, 11, 21, 22, 23, 33, 43, and 44 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Gersberg and Cho.

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2007).

REVERSED; 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b)

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4 ST. ONGE STEWARD JOHNSTON & REENS, LLC
5 986 BEDFORD STREET
6 STAMFORD, CT 06905-5619